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Abstract. Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) for multi-owner model
draws much attention as it enables data users to perform searches over
encrypted cloud data outsourced by data owners. However, implement-
ing secure and precise query, efficient search and flexible dynamic system
maintenance at the same time in SSE remains a challenge. To address
this, this paper proposes secure and efficient multi-keyword ranked search
over encrypted cloud data for multi-owner model based on searching ad-
versarial networks. We exploit searching adversarial networks to achieve
optimal pseudo-keyword padding, and obtain the optimal game equilib-
rium for query precision and privacy protection strength. Maximum like-
lihood search balanced tree is generated by probabilistic learning, which
achieves efficient search and brings the computational complexity close
to O(logN). In addition, we enable flexible dynamic system maintenance
with balanced index forest that makes full use of distributed computing.
Compared with previous works, our solution maintains query precision
above 95% while ensuring adequate privacy protection, and introduces
low overhead on computation, communication and storage.
Keywords: Searchable Symmetric Encryption· Multi-owner · Ranked
Search· Searching Adversarial Networks· Maximum Likelihood
1 Introduction
Background and Motivation. In cloud computing, searchable symmetric en-
cryption (SSE) for multiple data owners model (multi-owner model, MOD) draws
much attention as it enables multiple data users (clients) to perform searches
over encrypted cloud data outsourced by multiple data owners (authorities).
Unfortunately, none of the previously-known traditional SSE scheme for MOD
achieve secure and precise query, efficient search and flexible dynamic system
maintenance at the same time [9]. This severely limits the practical value of SSE
and decreases its chance of deployment in real-world cloud storage systems.
Related Work and Challenge. SSE has been continuously developed since
it was proposed by Song et al. [12], and multi-keyword ranked search over en-
crypted cloud data scheme is recognized as outstanding [9]. Cao et al. [1] first
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proposed privacy-preserving multi-keyword ranked search scheme (MRSE), and
established strict privacy requirements. They first employed asymmetric scalar-
product preserving encryption (ASPE) approach [15] to obtain the similarity
scores of the query vector and the index vector, so that the cloud server can re-
turn the top-k documents. However, they did not provide the optimal balance of
query precision and privacy protection strength. For better query precision and
query speed, Sun et al. [13] proposed MTS with the TF×IDF keyword weight
model, where the keyword weight depends on the frequency of the keyword in
the document and the ratio of the documents containing this keyword to the to-
tal documents. This means that TF×IDF cannot handle the differences between
data from different owners in MOD, since each owner’s data is different and there
is no uniform standard to measure keyword weights. Based on MRSE, Li et al. [8]
proposed a better solution (MKQE), where a new index construction algorithm
and trapdoor generation algorithm are designed to realize the dynamic expan-
sion of the keyword dictionary and improve the system performance. However,
their scheme only realized the linean search efficiency. Xia et al. [16] provided
EDMRS to support flexible dynamic operation by using balanced index tree
that builded following the bottom-up strategy and “greedy” method, and they
used parallel computing to improve search efficiency. However, when migrating
to MOD, ordinary balanced binary tree they employed is not optimistic [6]. It
is frustrating that the above solutions only support SSE for single data owner
model. Due to the diverse demand of the application scenario, such as emerging
authorised searchable technology for multi-client (authority) encrypted medical
databases that focuses on privacy protection [17,18], research on SSE for MOD is
increasingly active. Guo et al. [6] proposed MKRS MO for MOD, they designed
a heuristic weight generation algorithm based on the relationships among key-
words, documents and owners (KDO). They considered the correlation among
documents and the impact of documents’ quality on search results, so that the
KDO is more suitable for MOD than the TF×IDF. However, they ignored the
secure search scheme in known background model [1](a threat model that mea-
sures the ability of “honest but curious” cloud server [14,20] to evaluate private
data and the risk of revealing private information in SSE system). Currently,
SSE for MOD is still these challenges: (1) comprehensively optimizing query
precision and privacy protection is difficult; (2) a large amount of different data
from multiple data owners make the data features sparse, and the calculation
of high-dimensional vectors can cause “curse of dimensionality”; (3) frequent
updates of data challenge the scalability of dynamic system maintenance.
Our Contribution. This paper proposes secure and efficient multi-keyword
ranked search over encrypted cloud data for multi-owner model based on search-
ing adversarial networks (MRSM SAN). Specifically, including the following three
techniques: (1) optimal pseudo-keyword padding based on searching ad-
versarial networks (SAN): To improve the privacy protection strength of SSE
is a top priority. Padding random noise into the data [1, 8, 19] is a current pop-
ular method designed to interfere with the analysis and evaluation from cloud
server, which protects the document content and keyword information better.
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However, such an operation will reduce the query precision [1]. In response to
this, we creatively use adversarial learning [4] to obtain the optimal probability
distribution for controlling pseudo-keyword padding and the optimal game equi-
librium for the query precision and the privacy protection strength. This makes
query precision exceeds 95% while ensuring adequate privacy protection, which
is better than traditional SSE [1, 6, 8, 13, 16]; (2) efficient search based on
maximum likelihood search balanced tree (MLSB-Tree): The construc-
tion of the index tree is the biggest factor affecting the search efficiency. If the
leaf nodes of the index tree are sorted by maximum probability (the ranking of
the index vectors from high to low depends on the probability of being searched),
the computational complexity will be close to O(logN) [7]. Probabilistic learning
is employed to obtain MLSB-Tree, which is ordered in a maximum probability.
The experimental evaluation shows that MLSB-Tree-based search is faster and
more stable compare with related works [6,16]; (3) flexible dynamic system
maintenance based on balanced index forest (BIF): Using unsupervised
learning [3,10] to design a fast index clustering algorithm to classify all indexes
into multiple index partitions, and a corresponding balanced index tree is con-
structed for each index partition, thus all index trees form BIF. Owing to BIF
is distributed, it only needs to maintain the corresponding index partition with-
out touching all indexes in dynamic system maintenance, which improves the
efficiency of index update operations and introduces low overhead on the com-
putation, communication and storage. In summary, MRSM SAN increases the
possibility of deploying dynamic SSE in real-world cloud storage systems.
Organization and Version Notes. Section 2 describes scheme. Section 3
conducts experimental evaluation. Section 4 discusses our solution. Compared
with the preliminary version [2], this paper adds algorithms, enhances secu-
rity analysis, and conducts more in-depth experimental analysis of the proposed
scheme.
2 Secure and Efficient MRSM SAN
2.1 System Model
The proposed system model consists of four parties, is depicted in Fig. 1. Data
owners (DO) are responsible for constructing searchable index, encrypting data
and sending them to cloud server or trusted proxy; Data users (DU) are con-
sumers of cloud services. Based on attribute-based encryption [5], once DO au-
thorize DU attributes related to the retrieved data, DU can retrieve the corre-
sponding data; Trusted proxy (TP ) is responsible for index processing, query
and trapdoor generation, user authority authentication; Cloud server (CS)
provides cloud service, including running authorized access controls, performing
searches over encrypted cloud data based on query requests, and returning top-k
documents to DU . CS is considered“honest but curious” [14, 20], so that it is
necessary to provide a secure search scheme to protect privacy. Our goal is to
protect index privacy, query privacy and keyword privacy in dynamic SSE.
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Fig. 1. The basic architecture of MRSM SAN
2.2 MRSM SAN Framework
Setup: Based on index clustering results (s index partitions) and privacy re-
quirements in known background model [1], TP determines the size Ni of
sub-dictionary Di, the number Ui of pseudo-keyword, sets the parameter
Vi = Ui +Ni. Thus V = {V1,. . . ,Vs}, U = {U1,. . . ,Us}, N = {N1,. . . ,Ns}.
KeyGen(V ): TP generates key SK = {SK1,. . . ,SKs}, where SKi = {Si,Mi,1,
Mi,2}, Mi,1 and Mi,2 are two Vi × Vi-dimensional invertible matrices, Si is
a random Vi-dimensional vector. Symmetric key SKi = {Si, M
−1
i,1 , M
−1
i,2 }.
Extended-KeyGen(SKi, Zi): For dynamic search [8, 16], if Zi new keywords
are added into the i-th sub-dictionary, TP generates a new key SK ′i = {S
′
i,
M ′i,1, M
′
i,2}, where M
′
i,1 and M
′
i,2 are two (Vi + Zi)× (Vi + Zi)-dimensional
invertible matrices, Si is a new random (Vi + Zi)-dimensional vector.
BuildIndex(F, SK): To realize secure search in known background model [1],
TP pads Ui pseudo-keyword into weighted index I (associated with docu-
ment F ) to obtain secure index I˜, and uses I˜ and SK to generate BIF F =
{τ1,. . . ,τs} and encrypted BIF F˜ = {τ˜1,. . . ,τ˜s}. Finally, TP sends F˜ to CS.
Trapdoor(Q,SK): DU send query requests (keywords and their weights) and
attribute identification to TP . TP generates query Q = {Q1,. . . ,Qs} and
generates trapdoor T = {T1,. . . ,Ts} using SK. Finally, TP sends T to CS.
Query(T, F˜, t, k): TP sends query information to CS and specifies t index par-
titions to be queried. CS performs searches and retrieves top-k documents.
2.3 Algorithms for Scheme
1. Binary Index Generation : DOi uses algorithm 1 to generate the binary
index (vector) Ii for the document Fi, and sends Ii to TP .
2. Fast Index Clustering & Keyword Dictionary Segmentation : We
employ algorithm 2 to solve “curse of dimensionality” issue in computing.
3. Weighted Index Generation : TP exploits the KDO weight model [6] to
generate the weighted index, as shown in algorithm 3.
4. MLSB-Tree and BIF Generation : TP uses algorithm 4 to generate
MLSB-Tree τ1, . . . , τs and BIF F = {τ1, . . . , τs}.
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Algorithm 1 Binary Index Generation
Input: Document set F = {F1, . . . , Fm}, keyword dictionary D = {w1, . . . , wn}.
Output: Binary index set I = {I1, . . . , Im}.
1: for i = 1, to m do
2: Based on Vector Space Model [11] and keyword dictionary D, DOi generates binary index
Ii = {Ii,1,. . . ,Ii,ni} for document Fi = {Fi,1,. . . ,Fi,ni}, where Ii,j is a binary index vector.
3: return Binary index Index I
Algorithm 2 Fast Index Clustering & Keyword Dictionary Segmentation
Input: Binary index (vector) I from DO, where I = {I1,. . . ,Im}, DO = {DO1,. . . ,DOm}.
Output: s index partitions, s sub-dictionaries and new binary index Î = {Î1, . . . , Îs}.
1: Local Clustering: For I = {I1,. . . ,Im}, TP uses Twin Support Vector Machine [3] to classify
the index vectors {Ii,1, . . . , Ii,ni} in Ii into 2 clusters (i-th and (m+ i)-th initial index
partition) and obtain the representative vectors for the i-th and the (m+ i)-th initial index
partition. return 2m initial index partitions and their representative vectors.
2: Global Clustering: TP uses Manhattan Frequency k-Means [10] algorithm to group all initial
index partitions (representative vectors) into s final index partitions. return s index partitions.
3: Keyword Dictionary Segmentation: According to the obtained s index partitions, the keyword
dictionary D is divided into s sub-dictionaries D1, . . . , Ds correspondingly, where Di =
{wi1, . . . , w
i
Ni
}. TP obtains new binary index Î = {Î1, . . . , Îs}, where Ii = {Îi,1, . . . , Îi,Mi},
Îi,j is a Ni-dimensional vector. Delete “public redundancy zero element” of all index
vectors in the same index partition, thus the length of the index vector becomes shorter than
before. return s sub-dictionaries and new binary index Î for s index partitions.
Algorithm 3 Secure Weighted Index Generation
Input: Binary index Î for s index partitions.
Output: Secure weighted index I˜ for s index partitions, i.e. the data type is floating point.
1: Correlativity Matrix Generation: Using the corpus to determine the semantic relationship
between different keywords and obtain the correlativity matrix SNi×Ni (symmetric matrix).
2: Weight Generation: Based on KDO [6], construct the average keyword popularity AKP about
DO. Specifically, calculate AKPi of DOi with equation “AKPi = (Pi · Îi) ⊗ αi”, where the
operator ⊗ denotes the product of two vectors corresponding elements, αi = (αi,1,. . . ,αi,Ni ),
if |Li(w
i
t)| 6= 0, αi,t =
1
|Li(w
i
t
)|
, otherwise αi,t = 0 (where |Li(w
i
t)| is the number of
documents contain keyword wit that in i-th sub-dictionary Di, t ∈ {1, . . . , Ni}). Calculate the
raw weight information for DOi, W
raw
i = SNi×Ni · AKPi, where W
raw
i = (W
raw
i,1 ,. . . ,W
raw
i,Ni
).
3: Normalized Processing: Obtain the maximum raw weight of every keyword among different
DO, Wmax = (W
raw
i′,1
,W raw
i′,2
, . . .). Based on the Wmax, calculate Wi,t =
Wraw
i,t
Wmax[j]
4: Weighted Index Generation: TP obtains weighted index vector with “Ii,j = Îi,j ⊗Wi”, where
Ii,j associated with document Fi,j corresponds to the i-th index partition (j ∈ {1, . . . ,Mi}).
5: Secure Weighted Index Generation: TP pads Ui pseudo-keyword into I in i-th index partition
to obtain Vi-dimensional secure weighted index I˜ with high privacy protection strength [16,19].
Algorithm 4 MLSB-Tree and BIF Generation
Input: Secure weighted index I˜ for s index partitions, randomly generated query vector Q.
Output: MLSB-Tree τ1, . . . , τs for s index partitions and BIF F for all indexes belong to DO.
1: for i = 1, to s do
2: for j = 1, to Mi do
3: Based on probabilistic learning, TP calculates “Scorei,j =
∑
n
k=1 I
T
i,j ·Qi,k”; Then,
TP sorts Ii,1, . . . , Ii,Mi according to Scorei,1, . . . , Scorei,Mi ; Finally, TP follows the
bottom-up strategy and generates MLSB-Tree τi (balanced tree) with greedy method [16].
4: return MLSB-Tree τ1, . . . , τs.
5: return BIF F = {τ1,. . . ,τs}.
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Algorithm 5 Encrypted MLSB-Tree and Encrypted BIF Generation
Input: BIF F = {τ1, . . . , τs} and key SK = {SK1, . . . , SKs}, where SKi = {Si,Mi,1,Mi,2}.
Output: Encrypted BIF F˜ = {τ˜1,. . . ,τ˜s}.
1: for i = 1, to s do
2: TP encrypts MLSB-Tree τi with the secret key SKi to obtain encrypted MLSB-Tree τ˜i.
3: for j = 1, to n do
4: TP “splits” vector ui,j .v of ui,j (node of τi) into two random vectors ui,j .v1, ui,j .v2.
5: if Si[t] = 0 then
6: ui,j .v1[t] = ui,j .v2[t] = ui,j .v[t].
7: else
8: if Si[t] = 1 then
9: ui.v1[t] is a random value ∈ (0, 1), ui,j .v2[t] = ui,j .v[t]− ui,j .v1[t].
10: TP encrypts ui,j .v with reversible matrices Mi,1 and Mi,2 to obtain “u˜i,j .v = {u˜i,j .v1,
u˜i,j .v2} = {M
T
i,1ui,j .v1,M
T
i,2ui,j .v2}”, where ui,j .v1 and ui,j .v2 are Vi-length vectors
11: return Encrypted MLSB-Tree τ˜i.
12: return Encrypted Encrypted BIF F˜ = {τ˜1,. . . ,τ˜s}.
Algorithm 6 Trapdoor Generation and GDFS(T, F˜ , t, k)
Trapdoor Generation
Input: Query vector Q = {Q1, . . . , Qs}.
Output: Trapdoor T = {T1, . . . , Ts}.
1: for i = 1, to s do
2: TP “splits” query vector Qi into two
random vectors Qi,1 and Qi,2.
3: if Si[t] = 0 then
4: Qi,1[t] is a random value ∈ (0, 1),
Qi,2[t] = Qi[t]−Qi,1[t].
5: else
6: if Si[t] = 1 then
7: Qi,1[t] = Qi,2[t] = Qi[t], where
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Vi}.
8: TP encrypts Qi,1 and Qi,2 with
reversible matrices M−1
i,1 and M
−1
i,2 to
obtain trapdoor “Ti = {Q˜i,1, Q˜i,2} =
{M−1i,1Qi,1,M
−1
i,2Qi,2}”.
9: return T = {T1, . . . , Ts}.
GDFS(T, F˜, t, k)
Input: Query(T, F˜ , t, k).
Output: top-k documents.
1: for i = 1, to s do
2: if τi is the specified index tree then
3: if ui,j is a non-leaf node then
4: if Score(u˜i,j.v, Ti) > ⌈ kt ⌉-th
score then
5: GDFS(ui,j .high-child)
6: GDFS(ui,j .low-child)
7: else
8: return
9: else
10: if Score(u˜i,j .v, Ti) > ⌈ kt ⌉-th
score then
11: Update ⌈ k
t
⌉-th score for i-th
index tree τi and the ranked search result
list for F˜ .
12: return The final top-k documents for F˜.
5. Encrypted MLSB-Tree and Encrypted BIF Generation. TP encrypts
F using algorithm 5 and sends encrypted F˜ to CS. τi and τ˜i are isomorphic
(i.e.τi ∼= τ˜i) [16]. Thus, the search capability of tree is still well maintained.
6. Trapdoor Generation. Based on query request from DU , TP generates Q
= {Q1,. . . ,Qs} and T = {T1,. . . ,Ts} using algorithm 6, and sends T to CS.
7. Search Process. (1) Query Preparation: DU send query request and at-
tribute identifications to TP . If validating queries are valid, TP generates
trapdoors and initiates search queries to CS. If access control passes, CS
performs searches and returns top-k documents toDU . Otherwise CS refuses
to query. (2) Calculate Matching Score for Query on MLBS-Tree τi:
Score(u˜i,j .v,Ti)={M
T
i,1ui,j .v1,M
T
i,2ui,j .v2}·{M
−1
i,1Qi,1,M
−1
i,2Qi,2}=u
T
i,j .v·Qi
(3) Search Algorithm for BIF : the greedy depth-first search (GDFS) algo-
rithm for BIF as shown in algorithm 6.
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2.4 Security Improvement and Analysis
Adversarial Learning. Padding random noise into the data [1, 8, 19] is a
popular method to improve security. However, pseudo-keyword padding that
follows different probability distributions will reduce query precision to varying
degrees [1, 8]. Therefore, it is necessary to optimize the probability distribution
that controls pseudo-keyword padding. To address this, adversarial learning [4]
for optimal pseudo-keyword padding is proposed. As shown in Fig. 2. Searcher
Network S(ε) : The search result (SR) is generated by taking the random
noise ε (ε ∼ p(ε), p(ε) is the object probability distribution ) as an input and
performing a search, and supplies SR to the discriminator network D(x). Dis-
criminator Network D(x): The input has an accurate search result (ASR) or
SR and attempts to predict whether the current input is an ASR or a SR. One
of the inputs x is obtained from the real search result set distribution pdata(x),
and then one or two are solved. Classify problems and generate scalars ranging
from 0 to 1. Finally, in order to reach a balance point which is the best point
of the minimax game, S(ε) generates SR, and D(x) (considered as adversary)
considers the probability that S(ε) produces ASR is 0.5, i.e. it is difficult to
distinguish between padding and without-padding, thus it can achieve effective
security [19].
Fig. 2. Searching Adversarial Networks
Similar to GAN [4], to learn the searcher’s distribution ps over data x, we define
a prior on input noise variables pε(ε), then represent a mapping to data space
as S(ε; θs), where S is a differentiable function represented by a multi-layer
perception with parameters θg. We also define a second multi-layer perception
D(x; θd) that outputs a single scalar. D(x) represents the probability that x
came from the data rather than ps. We train D to maximize the probability of
assigning the correct label to both training examples and samples from S. We
simultaneously train S to minimize log(1 −D(S(ε))): In other words, D and S
play the following two-player minimax game with value function V (S,D):
min
S
max
D
V (D,S) = Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)] + Ex∼pε(ε)[log(1−D(S(ε)))]
Security Analysis. Index confidentiality and query confidentiality: ASPE ap-
proach [15] is widely used to generate secure index/query in privacy-preserving
keyword search schemes [1, 6, 8, 13, 16] and its security has been proven. Since
the index/query vector is randomly generated and search queries return only the
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secure inner product [1] computation results (non-zero) of encrypted index and
trapdoor, thus CS is difficult to accurately evaluate the keywords including in
the query and matching top-k documents. Moreover, confidentiality is further
enhanced as the optimal pseudo-keyword padding is difficult to distinguish and
the transformation matrices are harder to figure out [15].
Query unlinkability: By introducing the random value ε (padding pseudo-
keyword), the same search requests will generate different query vectors and
receive different relevance score distributions [1, 16]. The optimal game equilib-
rium for precision and privacy is obtain by adversarial learning, which further
improves query unlinkability. Meanwhile, SAN are designed to protect access
pattern [19], which makes it difficult for CS to judge whether the retrieved
ranked search results come from the same request.
Keyword privacy: According to the security analysis in [16], for i-th index
partition, aiming to maximize the randomness of the relevance score distribution,
it is necessary to obtain as many different
∑
ενi as possible (where νi ∈ {j|Qi[j+
Ni] = αi, j = 1, . . . , Ui}; in [16], αi = 1). Assuming each index vector has at least
2ωi different
∑
ενi choices, the probability of two
∑
ενi share the same value
is less than 12ωi . If we set each εj ∼ U(µ
′
i − δi, µ
′
i + δi) (Uniform distribution),
according to the central limit theorem,
∑
ενi ∼ N(µi, σ
2
i ) (Normal distribution),
where µi = ωiµ
′
i, σ
2 =
ωiδ
2
i
3 . Therefore, it can set µi = 0 and balance precision
and privacy by adjusting the variance σ2i in real-world application. In fact, when
αi ∈ [0, 1] (floating point number), SAN can achieve stronger privacy protection.
3 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented the proposed scheme using Python in Windows 10 operation
system with Intel Core i5 Processor 2.40GHz and evaluated its performance on a
real-world data set (academic conference publications provided by IEEE xplore
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/, including 20,000 papers and 80,000 different
keywords, 400 academic conferences were randomly selected as data ownersDO).
All experimental results represent the average of 1000 trials.
Optimal Pseudo-keyword Padding. The parameters controlling the proba-
bility distribution (using SAN to find or approximate) are adjusted to find the
optimal game equilibrium for query precision Pk (denoted as x) and rank privacy
protection P ′k (denoted as y) (where Pk = k
′/k, P ′k =
∑
|ri − r
′
i|/k
2, k′ and ri
are respectively the number of real top-k documents and the rank number of
document in the retrieved k documents, and r′i is document’s real rank number
in the whole ranked results [1]). We choose 95% query precision and 80% rank
privacy protection as benchmarks to get the game equilibrium score calculation
formula: f(x, y) = 195x
2+ 180y
2 (objective function to be optimized). As shown in
Fig. 3, we find the optimal game equilibrium (max f(x, y) = 177.5) at σ1 = 0.05,
σ2 = 0.08, σ3 = 0.12. The corresponding query precision are: 98%, 97%, 93%.
The corresponding rank privacy protection are: 78%,79%,84%. Therefore, we can
choose the best value of σ to achieve optimal pseudo-keyword padding to satisfy
query precision requirement and maximize rank privacy protection.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. With different choice of standard deviation σ for the random variable ε. {(a)
query precision(%) and rank privacy protection(%); (b) game equilibrium (score). explanation for
σ ∈ [0.01, 0.2]: When σ is greater than 0.2, the weight of the pseudo-keyword may be greater than
1, which violates our weight setting (between 0 and 1), so we only need to find the best game
equilibrium point when σ ∈ [0.01, 0.2].)
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Time cost of query for 1000 random searches in 500 sizes of data set. (a)
Comparison of tree-based search efficiency. Since the query is random, the search time fluctuates,
which causes the curves in the graph to have intersections; (b) Comparison of MLSB-Tree and BIF
search efficiency.
Search Efficiency of MLSB-Tree. Search efficiency is mainly described
by query speed, and our experimental objects are index trees that are struc-
tured with different strategy: EDMRS [16] (ordinary balanced binary tree),
MKRS MO [6] (grouped balanced binary tree), MRSM SAN(globally grouped
balanced binary tree) and MRSM SAN MLSB-Tree. We first randomly generate
1000 query vectors, then perform search on each index tree respectively, finally
take the results of 20 repeated experiments for analysis. As shown in Fig. 4(a),
the query speed and query stability based on MLSB-Tree are better than other
index trees. Compared with EDMRS and MKRS MO, query speed increased by
21.72% and 17.69%. In terms of stability, MLSB-Tree is better than other index
trees. (variance of search time(s): 0.0515 [6], 0.0193 [16], 0.0061[MLSB-Tree])
Search Efficiency of BIF. As shown in Fig. 4(b), query speed of MRSM SAN
(with MLSB-Tree and BIF) is significantly higher than MRSM SAN (only with
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MLSB-Tree), and the search efficiency is improved by 5 times and the stability
increase too. This is just the experimental result of 500 documents set with
the 4000-dimensional keyword dictionary. After the index clustering operation,
the keyword dictionary is divided into four sub-dictionaries with a dimension
of approximately 1000. As the amount of data increases, the dimension of the
keyword dictionary will become extremely large, and the advantages of BIF will
become more apparent. In our analytical experiments, the theoretical efficiency
ratio before and after segmentation is: η = s O(logN)O(logN)−O(log s) ,where s denotes the
number of index partitions after fast index clustering, and N denotes the total
number of documents. When the amount of data increases to 20,000, the total
keyword dictionary dimension is as high as 80,000. If the keyword sub-dictionary
dimension is 1000, the number of index partitions after fast index clustering is
80, the search efficiency will increase by more than 100 times (η = 143). This will
bring huge benefits to large information systems, and our solutions can exchange
huge returns with minimal computing resources.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Time cost of query for the same query keywords (10 keywords) in different
sizes of data set.{(a) Experimental results show that our solution achieves near binary search
efficiency and is superior to other existing comparison schemes. As the amount of data increases,
our solution has a greater advantage. It is worth noting that this is just the search performance
based on MLSB-Tree; (b) Comparison of MLSB-Tree and BIF. Based on experimental analysis, it
concludes that when data volume grows exponentially data features become more sparse, if all index
vectors only rely on an index tree to complete the search task, the computational complexity will be
getting farther away from O(logN). Sparseness of data features makes the similarity between index
vectors is mostly close to zero or even equal to zero, which brings trouble to the pairing of index
vectors. Moreover, the construction of balanced index tree is not global order, so it is necessary to
traverse many nodes in the search, which proves the limitation of balanced binary tree [6, 16]. We
construct MLSB-Tree with maximum likelihood method and probabilistic learning. Interestinglythe
closer the number of random searches is to infinity, the higher the search efficiency of obtained index
tree, this makes the computational complexity of search can converge to O(logN).}
Comparison of Search Efficiency (Larger Data Set). The efficiency of
MRSM SAN (without BIF) and related works [1, 6, 8, 16] are show as Fig. 5(a),
and the efficiency of MRSM SAN(without BIF) and MRSM SAN(with BIF) are
show as Fig. 5(b). It is more notable that the maintenance cost of scheme based
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on BIF is much lower than the cost of scheme only based on a balanced index
tree. When adding a new document to CS, we need to insert a new index vector
(the node of the tree) in the index tree accordingly. If it is only based on an index
tree, search complexity (search the location where the new index is inserted into
the index tree) and update complexity (update the parent node corresponding to
the new index) are both at least O(logN) [9], the total cost is 2O(logN) (where
N denotes the total number of documents). But BIF is very different, because
we group all index vectors into s different index partitions and reduce their
dimension. We assume that the number of index vectors in each index partition
is equal, thus we need to spend the same update operation for each partition,
which makes the cost is only 2
s
O(log N
s
) and enables flexible dynamic system
maintenance. Moreover, the increase in efficiency is positively correlated with
the increase in data volume and data sparsity. For communication, compared
with traditional SSE schemes [6, 13, 16], when the old index tree in the cloud is
overwritten by the new index tree uploaded by DO/TP , our scheme only needs
to update the specified index tree instead of the entire index forest. For storage,
tree-based overhead is (2logN − 12 )/(2
log N
s − 12 ) ≈ 2
log s times forest-based.
4 Discussion
This paper proposes secure and efficient MRSM SAN, and conducts in-depth se-
curity analysis and experimental evaluation. Creatively using adversarial learn-
ing to find optimal game equilibrium for query precision and privacy protection
strength and combining traditional SSE with uncertain control theory, which
opens a door for intelligent SSE. In addition, we propose MLSB-Tree, which
generated by a sufficient amount of random searches and brings the computa-
tional complexity close to O(logN). It means that using probabilistic learning to
optimize the query result is effective in an uncertain system (owner’s data and
user’s queries are uncertain). Last but not least, we implement flexible dynamic
system maintenance with BIF, which not only reduces the overhead of dynamic
maintenance and makes full use of distributed computing, but also improves the
search efficiency and achieves fine-grained search. This is beneficial to improve
the availability, flexibility and efficiency of dynamic SSE system.
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